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Abstract
This paper extends the Conditional Value-at-Risk approach of Adrian and Brunner-
meier (2011) by allowing systemic risk structures subject to economic regime shifts, which
are governed by a discrete, latent Markov process. This proposed Markov-Switching Con-
ditional Value-at-Risk is more suitable to Supervisory Stress Scenario required by Federal
Reserve Bank in conducting Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Reveiw, since it is ca-
pable of identifying the risk states in which the estimated risk levels are characterized.
Applying MSCoVaR to stress-testing the U.S. largest commercial banks, this paper
ﬁnds that the CoVaR approach underestimates systemic risk contributions of indi-
vidual banks by around 131 basis points of asset loss on average. In addition, this
paper constructs Banking Systemic Risk Index by value-weighted individual risk
contributions for speciﬁcally monitoring the systemic risk of the banking system as
a whole.
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1 Introduction
Recently, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) propose to measure systemic risk via the con-
ditional value-at-risk (CoVaR) of the ﬁnancial system, conditional on institutions being in
a state of distress. In their work, an institution's contribution to systemic risk is deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between CoVaR conditional on the institution being in distress and Co-
VaR in the median (normal) state of the institution. Hence, it characterizes the marginal
contribution of a particular institution (in a non-causal sense) to the overall systemic risk.
The CoVaR approach is particularly appealing in that it outlines a method to construct
a countercyclical, forward-looking systemic risk measure by predicting future systemic risk
using current institutional characteristics. This is a time-varying systemic risk measure
which does not rely on contemporaneous price movements and thus can be used to antici-
pate systemic risk. This method relates systemic risk measure to macroeconomic variables
and the balance sheet deleveraging and characteristics of individual institutions. This is
essentially a main regulatory concern of central banks.
A number of recent studies have extended and estimated the CoVaR measure of systemic
risk for a variety of ﬁnancial systems.1 Adams et al. (2011) estimate a system of quantile
regressions for four sets of major ﬁnancial institutions (commercial banks, investment banks,
hedge funds and insurance companies). Wong and Fong (2010) estimate CoVaR for the CDS
of Asia-Paciﬁc banks. Brunnermeier et al. (2012) use the CoVaR approach to examine the
contribution of non-interest income to sytemic bank risk. They ﬁnd that banks with a
higher non-interest income to interest income ratio have a higher contribution to systemic
risk and their contributions appear to be countercyclical to sytemic risk build-up. Lopez-
Espinosa et al. (2012) use the CoVaR approach to identify the main factors behind systemic
risk in a set of large international banks. They ﬁnd that short-term wholesale funding is a
key determinant in triggering systemic risk episodes.
1See e.g., Brunnermeier et al. (2012), Lopez-Espinosa et al. (2012), Rodriguez-Moreno and Pena (2012),
Arias et al. (2010), Girardi and Ergun (2012), Roengiptya and Rungcharoenkitkul (2011), and Van Oordt
and Zhou (2010), etc. Bisias et al. (2012) and Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012) provide comprehensive
reviews on systemic risk analytics.
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However, Bisias et al. (2012) raise the important econometric issue of nonstationarity
which is particularly relevant to systemic risk measurement. Virtually the existing methods
of systemic risk estimation and inference rely on the assumption of stationarity. In other
words, the joint distribution of the relevant variables is stable over time. Nonetheless,
the literature has recognized the stylized fact of structural breaks in macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial time series, so that the distribution structures of a time series might, driven by
economic states, evolve over time. Hence, the very nature of systemic risk implies a certain
degree of nonstationarity that may not always be consistent with the econometric framework
in which risk measures are typically estimated.
Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012) also concern that the CoVaR approach is vulnerable
to regime changes based on historical data. The estimated CoVaR value is undistinguished
from the distributions associated with i.e., a good economic state or an economic downturn.
In this regard, without informing its associated risk states, the CoVaR measure is at best an
averaging across diﬀerent economic regimes and hence less advisable to or even misleading
market participants and regulators in managing risks with ambiguous targets. Evidently,
Adams et al. (2011) have shown the sensitivity of systemic risk to tranquil, normal and
volatile economic states, while Lopez-Espinosa et al. (2012) have found that asymmetries
based on the sign of bank returns play an important role in capturing sensitivity of system-
wide risk to individual bank returns. These concerns highlight the need for new systemic
risk methods that are able to address nonstationarity in a more sophisticated way.
This paper speciﬁcally considers the systemic risk measure subject to regime shifts.
I extend the CoVaR measure of systemic risk to a nonlinear dynamic structure, namely
Markov-switching CoVaR (MSCoVaR), in which an instituion's contribution to systemic
risk is measured by allowing the joint distribution evolving over time. Switching regimes
is determined by the outcome of a latent, discrete Markov process, so that the conditional
value-at-risk can be obtained with the ﬁltered probabilities of risk states.
This paper characterizes two risk states: a normal risk level implied by good economic
periods and a high risk level associated with economic recessions, crises or extreme events.
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MSCoVaR is thus obtained for each risk state in stress-testing. Particularly, this paper ob-
tains MSCoVaR by estimating Markov-switching quantile autoregressive models (MSQAR)
recently developed by Liu (2014). MSQAR is the location-scale quantile autoregression in
which the location and scale parameters are permitted to evolve over time.
The MSCoVaR measure of systemic risk appears to have the advantage of naturally
ﬁtting to the Supervisory Stress Scenario required by Federal Reserve Bank in Compre-
hensive Capital Analysis and Reveiw (CCAR).2 In CCAR, a supervisory stress scenario is
a hypothetical scenario to be used to assess the strength and resillience of BHC capital
in a severely adverse economic environment. It represents an outcome in which the U.S.
economy experiences a signiﬁcant recession and economic activity in other major economies
also contracts signiﬁcantly, i.e., a deep recession in the United States, signiﬁcant declines in
asset prices and increases in risk premia, and a slowdown in global economic activity, etc.
Therefore, the MSCoVaR result from a high risk episode is well-deﬁned for the stress-testing
in Fed's supervisory stress scenario since it estimates a separate set of parameters for high
risk episodes.
In addition, the MSCoVaR measure of sytemic risk provides various ways to test diﬀerent
stress scenarios. For instance, if an instituion is systematically important, its hypothetically
distressed scenario should also cause a distress in ﬁnancial system. The systemic risk of a
systemically important institution can thus be measured by the high risk episodes of both
ﬁnancial system and the insitution. By contrast, as a non-systemically important instution,
its hyptothetical stress scenario, unless leading to a herding eﬀect, does not cause a distress
in ﬁnancial system. Hence, its systemic risk can be measured by using the high risk episode
of the insitution and the normal risk period of ﬁnancial system.
Importantly, the assumption in Liu (2014) that quantile error terms follow a three-
parameter asymmetric Laplace distribution (ADL) for ﬁltering transition probabilities of
regimes can also be used to simulate the Markov-switching conditional expected shortfall
2See Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review 2012 : Methodology and Results for Stress Scenario
Projections. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: March13 , 201 2; and Comprehensive
Capital Analysis and Review 2013: Assessment Framework and Results. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System: March 2013
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(MSCoES) from the MSQAR results. This provides a natural solution to the theoretical
issue that CoVaR is not a coherent risk measure due to its nonsubadditive nature.3 Note
that MSCoES takes distributional aspects within the tail into account. To this end, a
banking systemic risk index by value-weighted individual contributions is constructed for
monitoring systemic risk speciﬁc to the banking system as a whole.
This paper estimates MSCoVaR and MSCoES as risk contributions of the largest U.S.
commercial banks. The empirical results show strong evidence that ﬁnancial institutions
and the banking system as a whole experience regime shifts in their lower tails. The new
systemic risk measure shows that the CoVaR approach of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011)
underestimates systemic risk contributions of individual banks by around 131 basis points
of asset loss on average. The empirical results also show that the banking system is more
sensitive to marginal changes of an individual bank during high risk episodes than during
normal risk periods. In addition, Banking Systemic Risk Index presents the high relavence
of tracing ﬁnancial distress situations over the sample period.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes the Markov-switching
systemic risks measured by MSCoVaR and MSCoES. Markov-Switching Quantile Autore-
gression of Liu (2014) for estimating MSCoVaR and MSCoES are described in Appenix A.
Section 3 applies MSCoVaR and MSCoES methods to stress-testing the U.S. largest com-
mercial banks. In this section, the banking systemic risk index is also constructed. Section
4 concludes this paper.
2 Systemic Risk Measure
This section briefs the CoVaR measure of systemic risk and then extends it to deﬁne the
Markov-Switching CoVaR to identify risk states for a potential nonstationary time series. It
is followed by a discussion of simulating the Markov-switching conditional expected shortfall
as a coherent risk measure.
3See Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and Artzner et al. (1999).
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2.1 CoVaR
Recall that the value-at-risk of institution n given the probability of τ is
Pr (Xnt ≤ V aRnt ) = τ (2.1)
where Xnt denotes the asset return value of institution n at time t. The VaR of the ﬁnancial
system return (Xwt ) conditional on the event
{
C(Xnt ) : Xnt = V aRnt,τ
}
, i.e., institution n's
asset-return attains its VaR value, is denoted by CoV aR
w|n
t,τ , such that
Pr (Xwt ≤ CoV aRwt |C (Xnt )) = τ
Institution n's contribution to the system risk is thus deﬁned as
4CoV aRw|nt,τ = CoV aRw|nt,τ − CoV aRw|n,50%t,τ (2.2)
where CoV aR
w|n,50%
t,τ denotes the VaR of the ﬁnancial system when the institution n's
returns are at their median (normal) state as Pr
(
Xwt ≤ CoV aRwt |Xnt = V aRnt,50%
)
= τ .
For simplicity, this paper suppresses the superscript w. Hence, 4CoV aRnt,τ denotes the
diﬀerence between the VaR of the ﬁnancial system conditional on the distress of a particular
ﬁnancial institution n and the VaR of the ﬁnancial system conditional on the median state
of the institution n. Thus, 4CoV aRnt,τ quantiﬁes how much an institution n adds to overall
systemic risk. It captures the amount of additional risk that an institution inﬂicts upon
ﬁnancial system when the institution attains its VaR value.
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) apply quantile autoregressive models (QAR) of Koenker
and Xiao (2006) to estimate CoVaR in two steps as follows
Xnt = α
n
τ + ρ
n
τX
n
t−1 + γ
′n
τ Zt−1 + ε
n
t,τ (2.3)
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Xwt = α
w|n
τ + ρ
w|n
τ X
w
t−1 + β
w|n
τ X
n
t + γ
′w|n
τ Zt−1 + ε
w|n
t,τ (2.4)
where εt is quantile error terms and Zt is the predictive variables. From (2.2), the risk
contribution of an institution n to ﬁnancial system is then given by
4CoV aRnt,τ = βw|nτ
(
V aRnt,τ − V aRnt,50%
)
(2.5)
where V aRnt,τ = α
n
τ + ρ
n
τX
n
t−1 + γ
′n
τ Zt−1 is estimated from (2.3) and β
w|n
τ is estimated from
(2.4). In this framework, the existence of risk spillovers is captured through the parameter
β
w|n
τ : for non-zero values of this parameter, the left tail of the system distribution can be
predicted by observing the predetermined distribution of an institution's returns.
2.2 Markov-Switching CoVaR
To address the vulnerability of CoVaR to regime shifts and the requirement of stress-testing
of an institution in a hypothetically stressed scenario, i.e., a deep economic recession or asset
price downturn, this section deﬁnes the Markov-switching CoVaR measure of systemic risk
to identify distinct risk states as CoVaR subject to regime changes.
Let {st} be an ergodic homogeneous Markov chain on a ﬁnite set K = {1, ..., k} with a
transition matrix P deﬁned by the following transition probabilities
{pij = Pr (st = j|st−1 = i)}
for i, j ∈ K and assume st follow a ﬁrst-order Markov chain. Transition probabilities
satisfy
∑
j∈S pij = 1. In this paper, I deﬁne two distinct risk regimes, K = {1, 2}. Regime
1 (st = 1) represents a normal risk level which is implied by a good economic state and
regime 2 (st = 2) represents a high risk episode most likely associated with an economic
recession or ﬁnancial crisis. The risk structures are determined by data distributions of
each regime over time. Note that economic states, st, are unobservable so that switching
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in st is inferred by transition probabilities which are estimated from data.
Suppose that Xt can be observed directly but can only make an inference about the
value of st based on the observations as of date t. From (2.1), Markov-switching VaR
(MSVaR) of an instituion n can be deﬁned as
Pr (Xnt ≤ V aRnt |snt = j) = τ
and denoted by MSV aRnst,τ which represents the value-at-risk level of an institution n in
its risk regime j. Accordingly, the VaR of the ﬁnancial systemic returns conditional on the
event
{
C(Xnt ) : Xnt =MSV aRnst,τ
}
, denoted by MSCoV aRnst,τ , is given by
Pr (Xwt ≤ CoV aRwt |C (Xnt |snt = i) , swt = j) = τ
Note that the risk states of an institution and the ﬁnancial system are not necessarily
coincided, i.e., i 6= j. For instance, a non-systemically important institution being distressed
does not cause the same high risk episode to the whole ﬁnancial system. However, a
distressed ﬁnancial system may indeed cause a high risk episode for a non-systemically
important institution.
Apply the deﬁnition in (2.2) to obtain an institution n's contribution to systemic risk
as
4MSCoV aRnst,τ =MSCoV aRnst,τ −MSCoV aRn,50%st,τ
In this paper, MSCoVaR is estimated by Markov-Switching quantile autoregressive mod-
els (MSQAR), speciﬁed as
Xnt = α
n
st,τ + ρ
n
st,τX
n
t−1 + γ
′n
st,τZt−1 + ε
n
t,τ (2.6)
Xwt = α
w|n
st,τ + ρ
w|n
st,τX
w
t−1 + β
w|n
st,τX
n
t + γ
′w|n
st,τ Zt−1 + ε
w|n
t,τ (2.7)
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such that MSV aRnst,τ = α
n
st,τ + ρ
n
st,τX
n
t−1 + γ
′n
st,τZt−1 is estimated from (2.6) and then
MSCoV aRnst,τ = β
w|n
st,τMSV aR
n
st,τ
can also be computed based on the estimation results of (2.7). See Appendix A for details
of the MSQAR model estimation for (2.6) and (2.7).
In this MSCoVaR measure, β
w|n
st,τ depends on risk states. The response of ﬁnancial system
to a negative shock to an institution's balance sheet during a high risk episode (β
s|i
st=2,τ ),
hence, allows to be diﬀerent from a normal risk period (β
s|i
st=1,τ ). The set of coeﬃcients
estimated from high risk episodes describes the distributional structures of data in economic
recessions, crises or extreme events. Therefore, it is suitable to be applied to stress-testing
ﬁnancial instituions in supervisory stress scenario required by Federal Reserve Bank. Note
that if no risk regime-switching presents, MSCoVaR is equivalent to CoVaR. In this sense,
the CoVaR approach is a special case of the MSCoVaR measure when there is no structural
breaks. In this paper, I assume the presentence of distinct economic regimes based on the
ﬁndings in literature. However, an appropriate approach of testing the number of regimes
should be considered in future research.
The new framework of the MSCoVaR approach indeed provides ﬂexibility to test diﬀer-
ent stress scenarios. For instance,
Scenario(1) An extreme scenario is that the ﬁnancial system depends on the regimes of
systemically important banks. This scenario describes the recent ﬁnancial crisis as:
the ﬁnancial system is distressed once a systemically important bank is distressed,
while the ﬁnancial system is away from distress only if none of systemically important
banks are distressed. Hence, systemic risk contribution might be measured by
4MSCoV aRnt,τ = βw|nst=2,τ
(
MSV aRnst=2,τ −MSV aRn,50%st=1,τ
)
(2.8)
The ﬁrst product in the right side of (2.8) is the value-at-risk of ﬁnancial system
conditional on hypothetically assuming both the ﬁnancial system and the institution
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n in their high risk episodes. The second product in (2.8) is the value-at-risk of
ﬁnancial system conditional on normal states of that institution.
Scenario(2) In comparison, assuming current ﬁnancial system in regime 1, a distressed
institution n contributes systemic risk to ﬁnancial system given by
4MSCoV aRnt,τ = βw|nst=1,τ
(
MSV aRnst=2,τ −MSV aRn,50%st=1,τ
)
(2.9)
This scenario implies that the institution n is assumed to be not systemically im-
portant. Its high risk state does not cause a distressed ﬁnancial system. However,
it might still accumulate and contribute systemic risk to ﬁnancial system, especially
when herding eﬀects occurring.
Scenario(3) Even during a normal time if a systemically important ﬁnancial institution
reaches its VaR level, it also likely shocks ﬁnancial system into its high risk episode.
Hence, the systemic risk contribution of a distressed institution i can also be measured
by
4MSCoV aRnt,τ = βw|nst=2,τ
(
MSV aRnst=1,τ −MSV aRn,50%st=1,τ
)
(2.10)
For instance, an institution reaching its risk level during a normal period might be
caused by short-term maturity mismatch, while an institution reaching its high risk
episode might be caused by the large number of defaults on loans like the recent
subprime crisis. Despite that risk during a normal time is less severe than during
a high risk period, the highly interconnected banking system, herding eﬀects, and
market panic might contagiously amplify these negative impacts on ﬁnancial system
and hence lead to crises by i.e., ﬁre-sales and domino eﬀects, etc.
2.3 Markov-Switching CoES
VaR is not a coherent risk measure due to its nonsubadditivity and does not take distri-
butional aspects within the tail into account. This theoretical issue to some extent makes
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the CoVaR and MSCoVaR measures of systemic risk invalid. However, the asymmetric
Laplace distribution assumption in the MSQAR framework of Liu (2014) provides a con-
venient solution by obtaining expected shortfall through Monte Carlo simulation based on
model estimation results. Expected shortfall computed as conditional tail expectation is a
coherent risk measure and considers risks beyond the point of a VaR value. See Artzner et
al. (1999).
Using the simulation method in Appendix A and the estimation results from (2.6),
Markov-switching expected shortfall (MSES) for an institution n can be obtained and
denoted by MSESnst,τ . Then, conditional on the event
{
C(Xnt ) : Xnt =MSESnst,τ
}
, an
institution n's contribution to systemic risk is given by
4MSCoESnst,τ =MSCoESnst,τ −MSCoESn,50%st,τ
with MSCoESnst,τ = β
w|n
st,τMSES
n
st,τ . Expected shortfall can also be applied to the three
scenarios of measuring systemic risk discussed previously:
(1) 4MSCoESnt,τ = βw|nst=2,τ
(
MSESnst=2,τ −MSESn,50%st=1,τ
)
(2.11)
(2) 4MSCoESnt,τ = βw|nst=1,τ
(
MSESnst=2,τ −MSESn,50%st=1,τ
)
(2.12)
(3) 4MSCoESnt,τ = βw|nst=2,τ
(
MSESnst=1,τ −MSESn,50%st=1,τ
)
(2.13)
3 Stress-testing Commercial Banks
In this section, the MSCoVaR and MSCoES measures of systemic risk are estimated for
stress-testing the largest U.S. commercial banks, using the CoVaR measure of systemic
risk as the benckmark model. In addition, given the subadditivity property, the Markov-
switching expected shortfall is used to construct a banking systemic risk index (BSRI) via
value-weighted individual systemic risk contributions for monitoring dynamic systemic risk
of the ﬁnancial system.
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3.1 Data
Daily market equity data were taken from The Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP). The universe of bank holding companies (BHCs) are the stocks corresponding to
CRSP SIC codes 6000-6199 and 6712. Daily market data is used to form weekly returns
on market-valued total assets of individual banks. Following Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2011), a bank market-valued total asset is transformed from book-valued total assets into
market-valued total assets by applying market-to-book equity ratios. Then, the ﬁnancial
system return is computed as a value-weighted average on the returns of the universe of
banks.4
This paper considers the largest U.S. commercial banks since they are the targets of
current regulatory eﬀorts and would likely be considered too-big-to-fail by central banks.
Table 1 provides a bank list considered for stress-testing in this paper. The ultimate crite-
rion to conﬁgure the sample of potentially systemically important banks is the availability
of comparable data over a long enough period of time. This sifting criterion rules out some
large banks, i.e., HSBC, etc. The resulting sample is formed by a total of the 27 largest
BHCs sampled from June 1993 to June 2012 with 1000 weekly observations. Note that this
paper estimates the systemic risk contributions of the 27 commercial banks to the ﬁnancial
system, while the ﬁnancial system is constructed by the universe of ﬁnancial institutions
with the SIC code of 6000-6199 and 6712. Hence, the ﬁnancial system deﬁned in this paper
is equivalently referred to as the banking system hereafter.
[Table 1 about here]
The identiﬁcation of risk regimes is enhanced by using a set of macro-ﬁnancial predictive
variables that are acknowledged to capture the expected return in ﬁnancial markets. I
choose a small set of predictive variables to avoid over-ﬁtting the data. The predictive
variables (Zt) used in this paper include: (1) the change in the credit spread (4cs) between
the 10-year Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond and the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond;
4See details in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and Lopez-Espinosa et al. (2012).
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(2) The change in the U.S. Treasury bill secondary market 3-month rate (43mtb); (3) the
change in the slope of the yield curve (4ys), measured by the yield spread between the
U.S. Treasury benchmark 10-year bonds and the U.S. 3-month T-bill rate; (4) liquidity
spread (ls), deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the 3-month U.S. repo rate and the 3-month
T-bill rate; (5) the S&P500 Composite Index return (sp); (6) the volatility Index (vix)
of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). All these variables are sampled weekly
and obtained from CBOE, the Federal Reserve Board's H.15 Release and the Datastream
database, respectively.
3.2 Empirical Results
Table 2 reports the results of the MSQAR model estimation with τ = 5%. Panel A presents
the results estimated from (2.6) for individual banks (Xnt ) conditional on predictive variables
(Zt−1), and Panel B estimated from (2.7) for the banking system (Xwt ) conditional on a
individual bank n (Xnt ) and predictive variables (Zt−1). This table displays the medians of
the coeﬃcient estimates, the numerical standard errors in square brackets, and the posterior
credible intervals (PCI) in parentheses, across banks.5
[Table 2 about here]
In Table 2, the quantile intercepts (αst,τ ) of both individual banks and the banking
system appear to have the non-overlapped PCIs between regimes (st = 1 and st = 2).
This indicates an eﬀective identiﬁcation of risk regimes by the label switching restriction.
The regime identiﬁcation is further enhaned by predictive variables: S&P 500 returns, the
changes in T-bill rates, market volatility for individual banks; and contemporaneous returns
of individual banks, the lagged banking system returns, S&P 500 returns, the change in
yield curve, and market volatility for the banking system. These predictive variables have
non-overlapped PCIs between regimes.
5The detail estimation results of each bank are not reported here to save space, but available upon
request. Numerical standard errors are obtained using batch mean method, e.g., Ripley (1987). The
posterior credible intervals are computed using the highest posterior probability regions with the 95%
credible level.
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In addition, the transition probabilities, which have the non-overlapped PCIs between
regimes, present a much higher level of the regime persistence during regime 1 than during
regime 2. The transition probability of regime 2 at 5% VaR is around 50%, which is
much lower than that at median levels around 92%.6 The explanation to this result is
that, compared to a deviation from the median or a normal risk period, whenever an
individual bank attains its 5% VaR (tail risk) in a high risk episode, the bank more likely
takes measures to resolve the risky situation immediately, i.e., adjusting capital structure
to reduce debt levels, implementing more conservative loan policies, etc. Those measures
aﬀect the persistence of a high risk episode. Similarly, when the banking system is stressed
in a high risk episode, regulators also likely intervene markets by monetary and/or ﬁscal
policies. The scale parameters (ςst) imply much higher standard deviations (around 20.85
and 5.988 for individual banks and the banking system, respectively) during regime 2 than
those during regime 1 (around 4.447 and 1.532 for individual banks and the banking system,
respectively).7 This result is highly consistent with the ﬁndings in literature that ﬁnancial
returns are more volatile during economic recessions and crises than economic good times.
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the predictive variables, including S&P 500, changes in
T-bill rates, changes in yield curves and market volatility, which have their PCIs excluded
zero values, show the predictability for the VaRs of individual banks. By contrast in Panel
B of Table 2, the predictors, including contemporaneous returns of individual banks, the
lagged banking system returns, S&P 500 returns, the change in yield curve, and market
volatility, which have their PCIs excluded zero values, present the predictability for the
VaRs of the banking system. For instance, among these predictors, a widening of yield
spreads and spikes in market volatility are generally associated with a larger one-period
ahead VaR value, and hence could be used to anticipate higher levels of downside risk. As
a result, the conditioning variables considered in the analysis have shown the predictability
for ﬁnancial systemic risk.
6The estimation results for τ = 50% are not reported in this paper to preserve space, but available upon
request.
7The implied variance is computed based on the formula provided in Appendix A.
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Interestingly, S&P 500 returns appear to countercyclically contribute to the systemic
risk of the banking system: the negative coeﬃcient of S&P 500 return in regime 1 implies
that a stock market boom accumulates tail risks in the banking system, while its positive
coeﬃcient in regime 2 provides that the increase in stock market prices recovers tail risks
of the banking system. Additionally, the contemporaneous returns of individual banks
appear to have a strong positive relationship with system risk. This contemporaneous
eﬀect exacerbates the downside risk level of the banking system due to the drop of a bank
return. The small numerical standard errors in Table 2 indicate reasonabe model estimation
accuracy.
Table 3 reports the VaR and MSVaR values of individual banks (Xnt ) estimated from
(2.3) and (2.6) conditional on predictive variables (Zt−1), respectively. MSES values are
simulated based on the model estimation results using the approaches in Appendix A.
Table 3 shows that given 5% probability, the worst possible outcome is MS estimated from
V aRt,τ (around 1,017 basis points) and STT (around 5,695 basis points) estimated from
MSV aRst=2,τ . On average, MSV aRst=2,5% values are about 800 basis points more riskier
than V aRt,5% results and about 1,200 basis points more riskier thanMSV aRst=1,5% results.
From the coherent risk measure, MSESst=2,5% and MSESst=1,5% results have about 110
and 120 basis points on average more riskier than MSV aRst=2,5% and MSV aRst=1,5%,
respectively.
[Table 3 about here]
Note that these estimated values are used in (2.5), (2.8)-(2.10), and (2.11)-(2.13) to
compute 4CoV aR, 4MSCoV aR, and 4MSCoES for measuring systemic risk contribu-
tions of individual banks. Due to the clear diﬀerence between V aR and MSV aR values in
Table 3, this evidence shows that existing VaR methods, which provide the results averaging
across diﬀerent economic regimes, do not well reﬂect extreme risk scenarios for stress-testing
purposes. In contrary, the risk levels obtained from high risk episodes (regime 2) are more
suitable for measuring hypothetically distressed contributions under supervisory stress sce-
narios.
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The disparity between regimes can also be observed in Figure 1, which plots theMSESnst,τ
values for the six largest U.S. commercial banks. The solid dark lines are the MSESnst,τ
estimates from regime 1 and the dashed light lines from regime 2. Generally speaking, high
risk episodes show higher dynamics and larger volatilities than normal risk periods. The
diﬀerence between regimes exists over time, and the gap is dramatically enlarged during
recessions and ﬁnancial crises. For instance, the risk level during the recent ﬁnancial crisis
of 2008-2009 is well reﬂected in regime 2 by showing a deep drop into far left tails.
[Figure 1 about here]
Table 4 reports the systemic risk sensitivities of the banking system as a whole condi-
tional on individual banks. The banks in this table are ranked based on risk sensitivity
coeﬃcients (β
w|n
st=2,τ ). The risk sensitivity coeﬃcients are the important elements for com-
puting systemic risk contributions in (2.5), (2.8)-(2.10), and (2.11)-(2.13). For comparison,
this table also includes the estimation results of the QAR model as the benchmark for
1-regime using (2.4).
[Table 4 about here]
The systemic risk sensitivity coeﬃcients in Table 4 show that many individual banks
tend to impact the banking system heavier during high risk episodes than during normal
risk periods, whereas for some other banks the opposite is true. For instance, the marginal
impact of BK on the banking system is 0.414 during high risk episodes much larger than
0.169 during normal risk periods. Diﬀerent sensitivities across regimes show asymmetric
eﬀects of individual banks on the banking system. Generally, it is observed that the systemic
risk sensitivity coeﬃcients of β
w|n
st=2,τ are also largerly diﬀerent from the sensitivity results
of 1-regime estimations (β
w|n
t,τ ). The higher value of a sensitivity coeﬃcient represents the
larger response of the banking system to individual banks' shocks. The negative coeﬃcients
of BBT and CMA banks imply that during high risk episodes these banks do not worsen
the systemic risk of the banking system, despite that their negative coeﬃcients are small
in magnitudes.
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Table 5 reports the systemic risk contributions of individual banks to the banking system
as a whole. 4MSCoV aR1, 4MSCoV aR2, 4MSCoV aR3, 4MSCoES1, 4MSCoES2,
and 4MSCoES3, are computed in each scenario of (2.8)-(2.10) and (2.11)-(2.13), respec-
tively. For comparison, the systemic risk contributions without switching regimes are also
computed from (2.5) as benchmarks. The ingredients for computing systemic risk con-
tributions are the systemic risk coeﬃcients (β
w|n
st,τ ) and individual banks' MSV aR
n
st,τ and
MSESnst,τ values. The banks in each scenario are ordered by their values of the systemic
risk contributions.
[Table 5 about here]
On average across banks, the systemic risk contribution from scenario (1) is around
131 basis points higher than that measured by the CoVaR approach. In addition, scenario
(2) generates the systemic risk contribution to the banking system about 72 basis points
on average higher than that measured by the CoVaR approach. These results clearly
show empirical evidence of the underestimated systemic risk contributions by the CoVaR
approach.
The orders of individual banks' systemic risk contributions are very diﬀerent between
4MSCoV aR1 and 4CoV aR measures as well. For instance, the systemic risk contribu-
tion of STT is the highest in the 4MSCoV aR1 measure, while the highest systemic risk
contribution in the 4CoV aR measure is the AXP bank. The diﬀerence between their con-
tributions is as large as about 827 basis points. A strong negative relationship between
systemic risk contributions and bank sizes has also been found through a OLS regression
(not reported here). This result indicates that the bigger the bank asset sizes are, the larger
the banks impact on the banking system. This result provides quantitative evidence for the
recent debate of too big to fail of banks.
Apparently, the 4MSCoV aR1 measure of systemic risk provides the most extreme
stressed outcomes among the 3 scenarios considered. Even in the case that a bank is not
systemically important but distressed during high risk episodes (scenario (2)), the average
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sytemic risk contribution is around 169 basis points which cannot be neglected. The orders
of systemic risk contributions also vary across the 3 scenarios.
In addition, Table 5 reports the simulated results of MSCoESst,τ . As seen, the sytemic
risks are similar between 4MSCoES1 and 4MSCoV aR1, and between 4MSCoES2
and 4MSCoV aR2, while the results from scenaior (3) are very diﬀerent. However, this
paper suggests to adopt the systemic risk measurement results of 4MSCoESst,τ since
4MSCoV aR is not a coherent risk measure.
Figure 2 plots the dynamics of systemic risk contributions measured by 4MSCoV aR1
and4CoV aR approaches along with the correlation.8 The results show that the4MSCoV aR1
measure of systemic risk contributions are more dynamic than the4CoV aRmeasure. Some
banks, i.e., JPMorgan Chase, Citi Financial Group and Morgan Stanley, etc., appear to
have high correlations (about 83%-95%) between4MSCoV aR1 and4CoV aR, while other
banks, i.e., Bank of America, Well Fargo, etc., have correlations below 50%. Furthermore,
4MSCoV aR1 and 4CoV aR are negatively correlated for the bank of USB. These results
show that systemic risk contributions measured by 4MSCoV aR1 and 4CoV aR are not
only diﬀerent in magnitudes, but also in the dynamics over sample periods.
[Figure 2 about here]
Table 6 reports the correlation matrix for banks' systemic risk contributions measured
by 4MSCoV aR1. The correlation matrix shows that banks are highly interconnected. For
instance, Bank of America is positively correlated with other banks ranging from 75%-95%.
Bank of America has the highest correlation of 96% with JPMorgan Chase bank. Among all
the banks sampled, BBT, CMA and SCHW are the only banks negatively correlated with
other banks. Table 6 shows that the potential contagious channels of a crisis are hidden
behind the high interconnections between banks.
8Instead of 4MSCoES1 and 4CoES, this paper makes the comparison between 4MSCoV aR1 and
4CoV aR, because Adrian and Brunnermier (2011) approach cannot be used to compute expected shortfall.
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3.3 Banking Systemic Risk Index
Figure 3 plots the quarterly systemic risk index of the banking sector (BSRI). The solid
line is the quarterly Financial Stress Index constructed by Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis (STLFSI). The dashed line is quarterly BSRI constructed by the value-weighted
4MSCoES1 on individual banks as
BSRIt = −
N∑
n=1
wnt4MSCoESnt,τ
where weekly 4MSCoV aRnt,τ is aggregated to quarterly frequency and wnt is the bank
n's weight based on its market capitalization at time t. The shaded areas are NBER-
dated business cycle phases. Figure 3 shows that the constructed systemic risk index for
the banking sector is capable of reproducing the recent economic recession. The quarterly
BSRI reaches the highest risk during the recent ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2009. The BSRI also
shows a milder risk increase than STLFSI for the economic recession during the IT Bubble
Bust period since it is not a recession highly related to the banking sector. Figure 3 presents
a positive 61.5% comovement between the BSRI and the STLFSI. Furthermore, a simple
linear regression shows that the BSRI is able to signiﬁcantly explain the dynamics of the
Financial Stress Index by 37.83% (R2). Hence, the constructed BSRI index is supplementary
to monitoring ﬁnancial market risks by very speciﬁc to the risk nature of the banking sector.
[Figure 3 about here]
4 Conclusion
This paper has deﬁned a Markov-switching conditional Value-at-Risk (MSCoVaR) approach
to measure systemic risk of commercial banks. Applying the Markov-Switching Quantile
Autoregression framework of Liu (2014), systemic risks are estimated subject to regime
shifts within tails. The new method presents the advantage and ﬂexibility in supervisory
stress scenarios required by Federal Reserve Bank. I estimated systemic risk contributions of
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the U.S. largest commercial banks and found around 131 basis points of the underestimated
asset loss by the existing CoVaR measure of systemic risk. The banking system is more
sensitive to marginal changes of an individual bank during high risk episodes than during
normal risk periods. In addition, systemic risk contributions of individual banks are highly
interconnected. Furthermore, Banking Systemic Risk Index, constructed in this paper by
value-weighted individual systemic risk contributions, presents not only a high relavence
to trace ﬁnancial distress situtions, but also very speciﬁc to the risk nature of the banking
industry.
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Table 1
The Sample List of the U.S. Largest Commercial Banks as of 06/30/2012 Ranked in Total Assets
Ticker
Total Assets
Institution Name in thousand dollars as of 06/30/2012
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. JPM $2,290,146,000
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION BAC $2,162,083,396
CITIGROUP INC. C $1,916,451,000
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY WFC $1,336,204,000
MORGAN STANLEY MS $748,517,000
U.S. BANCORP USB $353,136,000
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORPORATION, THE BK $330,490,000
PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC., THE PNC $299,712,018
STATE STREET CORPORATION STT $200,368,976
BB&T CORPORATION BBT $178,560,000
SUNTRUST BANKS, INC. STI $178,307,292
AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY AXP $146,890,000
REGIONS FINANCIAL CORPORATION RF $122,344,664
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP FITB $117,542,579
CHARLES SCHWAB CORPORATION SCHW $111,816,000
NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION NTRS $94,455,895
KEYCORP KEY $86,741,424
M&T BANK CORPORATION MTB $80,807,578
BBVA USA BANCSHARES, INC. BBVA $66,013,042
COMERICA INCORPORATED CMA $62,756,597
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INCORPORATED HBAN $56,622,959
ZIONS BANCORPORATION ZION $53,418,819
POPULAR, INC. BPOP $36,612,000
PEOPLE'S UNITED FINANCIAL, INC. PBCT $28,134,752
SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP. SNV $26,294,110
BOK FINANCIAL CORPORATION BOKF $25,561,731
FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORPORATION FHN $25,493,925
Note: The composition of the banks is based on consolidated assets, lagged by one quarter.
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Table 3
VaR, MSVaR and MSES estimates of individual banks
V aRt,5%
MSV aR MSES
MSV aRst=1,5% MSV aRst=2,5% MSESst=1,5% MSESst=2,5%
JPM -6.286 -2.642 -9.204 -2.835 -9.760
BAC -7.324 -2.919 -12.21 -3.141 -13.14
C -9.446 -4.711 -35.62 -5.038 -37.56
WFC -5.813 -2.096 -9.047 -2.269 -9.699
MS -10.17 -5.384 -18.45 -5.750 -20.12
USB -6.670 -4.141 -22.91 -4.419 -25.01
BK -6.069 -2.482 -9.572 -2.687 -10.10
PNC -6.172 -3.105 -10.07 -3.325 -10.79
STT -7.273 -5.403 -56.95 -5.761 -59.75
BBT -6.207 -2.497 -10.16 -2.686 -11.00
STI -6.804 -2.530 -10.89 -2.712 -11.72
AXP -5.664 -2.892 -9.574 -3.105 -10.10
RF -9.327 -3.521 -16.27 -3.757 -17.40
FITB -7.176 -3.360 -15.21 -3.598 -16.19
SCHW -9.652 -5.767 -21.68 -6.158 -23.06
NTRS -5.382 -1.600 -7.555 -1.759 -7.979
KEY -6.730 -3.047 -12.03 -3.256 -12.83
MTB -5.212 -2.711 -11.91 -2.914 -14.17
BBVA -8.094 -3.991 -15.38 -4.277 -17.28
CMA -7.454 -2.990 -11.64 -3.220 -12.44
HBAN -7.482 -2.784 -11.81 -2.990 -12.82
ZION -7.620 -2.709 -12.49 -2.914 -13.45
BPOP -8.345 -2.543 -12.57 -2.729 -13.42
PBCT -5.087 -2.865 -9.344 -3.084 -9.881
SNV -8.161 -2.821 -12.937 -3.039 -13.80
BOKF -5.360 -2.532 -9.309 -2.731 -9.876
FHN -7.372 -2.421 -12.18 -2.623 -13.32
The entries are VaR and MSVaR values of individual banks (Xnt ) estimated from (2.3) and (2.6) conditional on
predictive variables (Zt−1), respectively. MSES values are simulated based on the model estimation results using
the approaches in Appendix A. The values are ordered by banks' total asset values.
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Table 4
Systemic risk sensitivities
Banks βw|n
5%
β
w|n
st=1,5%
β
w|n
st=2,5%
BK 0.227 0.169 0.414
NTRS 0.208 0.178 0.374
AXP 0.272 0.213 0.359
BOKF 0.111 0.087 0.279
WFC 0.222 0.207 0.256
USB 0.185 0.116 0.238
PNC 0.209 0.196 0.231
PBCT 0.178 0.080 0.231
JPM 0.195 0.221 0.228
KEY 0.193 0.146 0.224
BBVA 0.096 0.039 0.214
STI 0.158 0.222 0.194
SNV 0.107 0.163 0.184
MTB 0.170 0.119 0.179
STT 0.152 0.071 0.173
BAC 0.143 0.197 0.147
RF 0.136 0.106 0.119
MS 0.090 0.047 0.118
ZION 0.096 0.111 0.113
BPOP 0.016 0.009 0.097
HBAN 0.068 0.162 0.058
FITB 0.112 0.123 0.055
FHN 0.115 0.059 0.049
C 0.040 0.085 0.023
SCHW 0.072 0.019 0.011
BBT 0.136 0.122 -0.048
CMA 0.129 0.110 -0.075
βτ and βst,τ are estimated from QAR and MSQAR models on (2.4)
and (2.7), respectively. The banks in this table are ranked based
on the risk sensitivity coeﬃcients (β
w|n
st=2,5%
).
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Figure 3
Banking Systemic Risk Index (BSRI). The solid line is the ﬁnancial stress index
constructed by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the dashed line is BSRI
constructed by the value-weighted 4MSCoES1 on individual banks.
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A TheMarkov-Switching Quantile Autoregressive Model
Estimation
This appendix brieﬂy describes the estimation method of Markov-Switching Quantile Au-
toregressive models as proposed in Liu (2014), with an extension of adding exogenous
variables. For more details on the model, see the author's original work.
Rewrite (2.6) and (2.7) in a general MSQAR model form as follows
Xt = θst,0(τ) +
L∑
l=1
θst,l(τ)Xt−l +
R∑
r=1
δ
′
st,r(τ)Zt−r + εt(τ)
with the τth quantile of Xt given by
QXt (τ |X t−1,Zt−1,θst) = θst,0(τ) +
L∑
l=1
θst,l(τ)Xt−l +
R∑
r=1
δ
′
st,r(τ)Zt−r
where θst(τ) = {θst,0(τ), ..., θst,L(τ), δ′st,1(τ), ..., δ
′
st,R
(τ)},X t−1 = {Xt−1, ...., Xt−l} andZt−1 =
{Zt−1, ..., Zt−R}. Assume quantile error terms, εt(τ), follow a three parameter asymmetric
Laplace distribution of Yu and Zhang (2005), ALD(0, ς, τ), with the density function given
by
f(ε; 0, ς, τ,θst) =
τ(1− τ)
ςst
(A.1)
exp
{
− (Xt −Qyt (τ |Xt−1,Zt−1,θst)) (τ − I (Xt ≤ Qyt (τ |Xt−1,Zt−1,θst)))
ςst
}
where I(·) is an indicator function. τ determines the skewness of the distribution, ς > 0 is a
scale parameter. ALD(0, ς, τ) with the location parameter being zero provides that the τth
quantile of the distribution is zero as Pr (εt ≤ 0) = τ , which satisﬁes the quantile regression
condition
´ 0
−∞ fε(q)dq = τ . The asymmetric-Laplace distribution with the density function
of (A.1) has the mean and variance, E(εt) = ς(1 − 2τ)/[(1 − τ)τ ] and V ar(εt) = ς2(1 −
2τ + 2τ 2)/[(1− τ)2τ 2], respectively. See Yu and Zhang (2005) for details.
Suppose that Xt can be observed directly but can only make an inference about the
value of st based on the observations as of date t. The inference for unobservable states is
based on the ﬁltering probability as
ξj,t|t = Pr (st = j|Xt,Zt;Θ)
=
∑
i∈K
Pr (st = j, st−1 = i|Xt,Zt;Θ)
where
∑
j∈K ξj,t|t = 1 and Θ = (P,θst(τ)) is a vector of the parameters with st ∈ K. The
formulation of ﬁltering probabilities is obtained by Bayes theorem as
ξj,t|t =
∑
i∈K pijξi,t−1|t−1ηj,t
f (Xt|Xt−1,Zt−1, τ ;Θ) (A.2)
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where ηj,t is the conditional density in (A.1) given st = j, and
f(Xt|Xt,Zt, τ ;Θ) =
∑
j∈K
∑
i∈K
pijξi,t−1|t−1ηj,t
Thus, the relationship between the ﬁltering and prediction probabilities is given by
ξj,t+1|t = Pr (st+1 = j|Xt,Zt;Θ) =
∑
i∈K
pijξi,t|t (A.3)
The inference, similar to Hamilton's ﬁlter (Hamilton, 1994), is performed iteratively
for t = 1, ..., T with the initial values, ξj,0|0 for j ∈ K. The sample likelihood for the τth
conditional quantile of Xt is then given by
L(Θ) =
T∏
t=1
f(Xt|Xt,Zt, τ ;Θ) (A.4)
In this paper, regimes are labeled by the restrictions on quantile intercepts, for example,
θ1,0(τ) > ... > θk,0(τ). The MSQAR model is estimated by Bayesian method. See Liu
(2014) for details of the Bayesian model estimation. Note that the cummulative distribution
function of ALD(Q, ς, τ) is also provided in Yu and Zhang (2005) as
F (x;Q, ς, τ) =
{
τexp
(
1−τ
ς
(x−Qτ )
)
, if x ≤ Qτ
1− (1− τ)exp (− τ
ς
(x−Qτ )
)
, if x > Qτ
with the quantile function
F−1 (u;Q, ς, τ) =
{
Qτ +
ς
1−τ log
(
u
τ
)
, if 0 ≤ u ≤ τ
Qτ − ςτ log
(
1−u
1−τ
)
, if τ < u ≤ 1
The expected shortfall is deﬁned as the tail conditional expectation by
ESτ = E (X|X ≤ Qτ )
= E
(
F−1 (u;Q, ς, τ) |0 ≤ u ≤ τ) (A.5)
Based on the model estimation results of Qˆτ , the expected shortfall can be numerically
obtained by Monte Carlo simulation as follows
1. Randomly draw ui for i = 1, ..., N from a uniform distribution U = {ui : 0 ≤ u ≤ τ}.
In this paper, N = 5000.
2. Compute ESi,τ = F
−1
(
ui; Qˆ, ςˆ , τ
)
for i = 1, ..., N
3. Compute ESτ =
1
N
∑N
i=1ESi,τ
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Note that in a dynamic model setting of MSQAR, Qτ = QXt (τ |X t−1,Zt−1,θst) so that the
steps (1)-(3) are repeated for t = 1, ..., T to obtain MSESst,τ .
Generally, the scale parameter ς is a nuisance parameter when linking the nonlinear least
square (NLS) quantile autoregression of Koenker and Xiao (2006) to an asymmetric laplace
distribution (see i.e., Gerlach et al. (2011)), since it does not aﬀect quantile locations. How-
ever, in order to ﬁltering transition probabilities, MSQAR model estimation of Liu (2014)
assumes quantile error terms following an asymmetric laplace distribution. Therefore, the
scale parameter ς is used to estimate the distribution shape, which is no longer nuisance
and can be identiﬁed. An anolog to this sitution is the relationship between ordinary least
square (OLS) estimation and a linear model with the normal distribution assumption. If
assuming data following a normal distribution, its variance parameter must be estimated
and identiﬁed. However, using ordinary least square (OLS), the variance parameter is nui-
sance and cannot be identiﬁed. In many existing studies, variance parameters of normal
distributions have been modeled subject to regime shifts to describe the varying dispersions
driven by diﬀerent economic states. Hence, this paper allows the scale parameter subject
to regime shifts as well.
More importantly, since expected shortfall takes distributional aspects within the tail
into account, the shapes of distributions become highly relavant to estimate accurate ex-
pected shortfall. To simulate expected falls, the shape parameter is essential to characterize
the tail distribution shapes.
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